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in the Era of International Human Rights
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ABSTRACT
There is no critical race approach to international law. There are Third World approaches,
feminist approaches, economic approaches, and constitutional approaches, but notably
absent in the catalogue is a distinct view of international law that takes its point of departure
from the vantage of Critical Race Theory (CRT), or anything like it. Through a study of racial
ideology in the history of international legal thought, this Article offers the beginnings of an
explanation for how this lack of attention to race and racism came to be, and why it matters today.
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INTRODUCTION
International law is a strange business, and perhaps it has always been so. As
a field of governance meant to restrict the wills of emperors, kings, and presidents,
what was once called jus gentium surely boasts an unusual job description. Of
course, it is this very quality that likely accounts for both the field’s eternal
popularity, as well as its perennial opprobrium. But here in the first decades of the
twenty-first century, we might inquire about what is so especially strange about
international law in the present moment. After all, since the postwar inauguration
of the United Nations (UN), the functions of international law are now routine, if
still questionably effective. What is strange about our current international legal
order lies not in its fundamental purpose, or in its (in)ability to realize its aims. The
issue is this: There is a hole in the fabric of international law, and very few have
noticed.
To get a sense for this absence, consider Andrea Bianchi’s International Law
Theories: An Inquiry into Different Ways of Thinking. The book provides a recent
survey of what is and is not going on in the intensely eclectic world of
international legal thought.1 In his tour of what it means to think like an
international lawyer today, the scene includes no less than thirteen distinctive
modes, including Law and Economics, Marxism, Feminism, and Third World
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL).2 As the study attests, there is a lot
going on in the contemporary analysis of international law. What is not going on
in international legal thought, however, is the study of race. This silence was
flagged twenty years ago in a symposium organized by the Villanova Law Review,
titled “Critical Race Theory and International Law: Convergence and
Divergence.”3 In the introduction to the symposium, Ruth Gordon wrote,

1.
2.
3.

ANDREA BIANCHI, INTERNATIONAL LAW THEORIES: AN INQUIRY INTO DIFFERENT WAYS OF
THINKING (2016).
See generally id.
Ruth Gordon, Critical Race Theory and International Law: Convergence and Divergence, 45
VILL. L. REV. 827 (2000). A sample of representative writings that have emerged in the last two
decades since the symposium include ADOM GETACHEW, WORLDMAKING AFTER EMPIRE: THE
RISE AND FALL OF SELF-DETERMINATION (2019); JOHN REYNOLDS, EMPIRE, EMERGENCY AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2017); HENRY J. RICHARDSON III, THE ORIGINS OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN
INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008); MOHAMMAD SHAHABUDDIN, ETHNICITY AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORIES, POLITICS, AND PRACTICES (2016); E. Tendayi Achiume,
Beyond Prejudice: Structural Xenophobic Discrimination Against Refugees, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L.
323 (2014); Robert Knox, Valuing Race? Stretchead Marxism and the Logic of Imperialism, 4
LONDON REV. INT’L L. 81 (2016); Celina Romany & Joon-Beom Chu, Affirmative Action in
International Human Rights Law: A Critical Perspective of its Normative Assumptions, 36
CONN. L. REV. 831 (2004); Kim Benita Vera, From Papal Bull to Racial Rule: Indians of the
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“Traditional international discourse is framed in terms of formal equality, and race
appears to be an almost nonexistent factor. International legal theory rarely
mentions race, much less employs it as a basis of analysis.”4
Gordon’s assessment is unfortunately as relevant today as it was then.
Especially when we consider the flowering of international legal scholarship that
has taken place in the last two decades along with the rising popularity of
international law as a profession, the absence of race on Bianchi’s and many others’
lists is all the more puzzling. This silence is odd, not only because of the glaring
mismatch between a form of social dislocation that is only getting worse and a
global legal regime the interests of which remain elsewhere. The situation is
strange because the failure to grapple with racism and xenophobia is not
accidental. This hole in the global legal order is no oversight, it is not because of a
lack of resources, it is not because of a lack of enforcement power, and it is not
because of a lack of will. Or, at least, it is not only because of these things. Our
obliviousness about international law’s silence is a result of an ideology of
inclusion. And if that is right, a strange game is afoot.
But before getting to that, we should ask, is it correct to claim that
international law rarely mentions race?5 After all, the vulgar racism of the
nineteenth century was eventually displaced in the move to international
institutions that began with the League of Nations and the minority treaty system,
and which then developed into the United Nations and international human
rights law. With figures like Julian Huxley heading the newly formed United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and
Ashley Montagu leading UNESCO’s “statements on race” project, along with the
UN General Assembly’s adoption of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the middle decades of the
twentieth century gave international law an explicit and intentional rejoinder to

4.
5.

Americas, Race, and the Foundations of International Law, 42 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 453 (2012); and
Adrien Katherine Wing, Global Critical Race Feminism: A Perspective on Gender, War, and
Peace in the Age of the War on Terror, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 1 (2007).
Gordon, supra note 3, at 829–30 (emphasis added).
In this Article I do not have the space to take up the fascinating question of whether the Third
World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) movement does, in fact, provide a racial
approach to international law, and I simply take it as a given here that TWAIL and a critical
race approach to international law are meaningfully different things. At the level of
international institutions, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has
shouldered the task since the middle of the twentieth century. Today, the most prominent
agencies within that Office tasked with combating racism in international law are the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and the Special Rapporteur
on Contemporary Forms of Racism.
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nineteenth century racism.6 After the U.S. civil rights movement went
mainstream and South African apartheid finally collapsed, the global response to
racism seemed triumphant. To be sure, even on the mainstream view there was
work still to be done. In 1993, the United Nations Human Rights Council
established a Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, in 2001 a
world conference against racism was held in South Africa, and the international
machinery of administration and conferences continue to churn today.
My claim in this Article is that while it is certainly true that for more than a
century international lawyers have wrestled with the problem of racial prejudice
and the ability to craft international laws and institutions that might respond to
and regulate that racism, what has been very rarely addressed is the way in which
international legal thought is itself constituted by a structure of racial ideology.7
On this view, race and racism are not merely objects of legal regulation. Rather,
these concepts perform as modes of justification essential to the liberal
construction of the entire system.8 My claim therefore depends upon a distinction
between racism as a form of individual prejudice and anomalous behavior on the
one side, and racism as a structure of racial ideology on the other.

6.
7.

8.

See, e.g., MICHAEL BANTON, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF RACE (2002); PATRICK
THORNBERRY, THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: A COMMENTARY (2016).
This Article anticipates a much more extensive analysis in my forthcoming book, THE RULE OF
RACIAL IDEOLOGY: A GLOBAL CRITIQUE OF LAW, BORDERS, AND THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE
(forthcoming with Oxford University Press). For a discussion of ideology and law, see Justin
Desautels-Stein & Akbar Rasulov, Deep Cuts: Four Critiques of Legal Ideology, 31 YALE J.L. &
HUM. 435 (2021).
For a sample of the literature on critical race theory, see DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM
OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1993); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS
THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Celebrating Critical Race
Theory at 20, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1497 (2009); Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race,
Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985 (2007); and Athena D. Mutua,
The Rise, Development, and Future Directions of Critical Race Theory and Related Scholarship,
84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329 (2006). I do not want to be misunderstood for suggesting that racism
necessarily trumps other forms of discrimination in international law. Rather, the claim is that
racism garners far less attention than sexism or economic development in international law.
With respect to the reality of an intersectional pattern of worldwide discrimination, see, for
example, PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS,
AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT (2d ed. 2000); ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE, AND
CLASS (1983); AUDRE LORDE, Age, Race, Sex and Class: Women Redefining Difference, in SISTER
OUTSIDER 114 (rev. ed. 2007); Sumi Cho et al., Toward a Field of Intersectionality Studies:
Theory, Applications, and Praxis, 38 SIGNS 785 (2013); Kelly Coogan-Gehr, The Politics of Race
in U.S. Feminist Scholarship: An Archaeology, 37 SIGNS 83 (2011); and Rebecca L. Clark Mane,
Transmuting Grammars of Whiteness in Third-Wave Feminism: Interrogating Postrace
Histories, Postmodern Abstraction, and the Proliferation of Difference in Third-Wave Texts, 38
SIGNS 71 (2012).
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With respect to the study of racial ideology in international law, since the
middle decades of the nineteenth century and in the context of liberal political
theory, there have been three primary structures of racial ideology: classic,
modern, and postracial. The classic structure of racial ideology was singularly
focused on the production of raciality and the justification of exclusion. One
might presume that international lawyers in the nineteenth century had little
difficulty in excluding certain peoples from the realm of sovereignty. Exclusion,
after all, was hardly a new idea.9 For millennia, it was typical to separate the
barbarians from the zoon politikon. For even longer there have been characteristic
efforts to distinguish various peoples from one another on the basis of religion, and
before that, surely, there was “us” and “them.” After the introduction of liberal
theory, however, these old maneuvers for excluding outsiders from insiders were,
simply put, illiberal. Religion proved too blunt of a tool for distinguishing
analytically between the “civilized” and “uncivilized.” To be sure, a prominent and
recurring proxy for what counted as “civilized” was whether a sovereign was
Christian. As a mode of legal argument, however, references to religious authority
inevitably came into conflict with the liberal view of the rights-bearing individual
on which the new understanding of the sovereign was based.
It was precisely at the same time that international lawyers were seeking legal
justifications to exclude large portions of the world from the rights of sovereignty
that the science of racial classifications was exploding throughout the Western
world. First invented in the late seventeenth century and slowly evolved over the
course of the eighteenth, it was in the nineteenth century that raciality emerged as
a reliable piece of empirical science. Of course, this science of race was racist.10
Configured like a set of concentric circles, at the center of the target belonged the
most developed human beings, those peoples descended from the Caucasus
region between the Black and Caspian seas. One step out were those Aryan
relatives of the proto-Indo-European peoples that had migrated out to Spain,
India, and Persia. Next were the American Indians and “Mongoloid” peoples, and
finally were those descendants from the African continent. Each circle designated

9.

10.

See, e.g., WENDY BROWN, WALLED STATES, WANING SOVEREIGNTY (2010); MICHAEL BURLEIGH,
EARTHLY POWERS: THE CLASH OF RELIGION AND POLITICS IN EUROPE FROM THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION TO THE GREAT WAR (2005); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF
NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–960 (2001); JENNIFER PITTS, A
TURN TO EMPIRE: THE RISE OF IMPERIAL LIBERALISM IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE (2006).
See BRUCE BAUM, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CAUCASIAN RACE: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF RACIAL
IDENTITY 95–118 (2006); IVAN HANNAFORD, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN THE WEST
(1996). For the legal context of these concepts, see Justin Desautels-Stein, Race as a Legal
Concept, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1 (2012).
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a degree of intellectual, cultural, and spiritual achievement, starting with the
greatest achievements at the center and moving out accordingly.11
This hierarchy of racial classification became the model for what
international lawyers coined “the Family of Nations.”12 With respect to its
ideological structure—if not the reality of practice—at the center of the system
were the Great Powers. Next came those middle and small European powers, all
of whom enjoyed sovereign rights. Eventually the United States and the
“liberated” colonies of South America would join as well. The Persians, the
Ottomans, the Chinese, and Japanese existed in a semi-peripheral, quasi-civilized
outer circle beyond the borders of the Family of Nations.13 Africa existed further
out still. The ability to provide legal justifications for excluding much of the nonEuropean world was of great importance to the Great Powers: If a people could
claim sovereignty, they claimed the equal rights of civilization, of liberalism,
including rights of nonintervention and self-determination. What’s more, these
legal justifications needed to be liberal in and of themselves. After all, the hierarchy
of racial classification was no piece of ancient foolishness. It was new and
grounded in natural science. As a legal justification for the exclusion of peoples
from the Family of Nations, the science of racial classification was perfect.
In contrast, the modern structure of racial ideology emerged in the course of
the twentieth century with the following characteristics. First, there was a
weakening of the argument that theories of racial development could justify the
sovereign’s right to exclude other peoples from the Family of Nations, that
international community of rights-bearing peoples. Whereas in classic racial
ideology, race proved an international legal justification for exclusion, in the
modern form a more functional view of international society suggested the need
to be more inclusive. And in many important ways, the new international
institutions of the twentieth century did become, very slowly, more inclusive.
Second, modern racial ideology’s more catholic approach to international society
was underwritten by a shifting of the racialized right to exclude to the borders
between national communities. Whereas there had earlier been a far more laissezfaire approach to border controls, by the early decades of the twentieth century
sovereigns were relying on a new form of race science to justify the exclusion of
undesirable people at the border. This was a moment in which international law

11.
12.
13.

See NELL IRVIN PAINTER, THE HISTORY OF WHITE PEOPLE (2010); NANCY STEPAN, THE IDEA OF
RACE IN SCIENCE: GREAT BRITAIN 1800–1960 (1982).
For an overview of the “Family of Nations,” see 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 10–12,
31–35 (2d ed. 1912).
See ARNULF BECKER LORCA, MESTIZO INTERNATIONAL LAW: A GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
1842–1933 (2014).
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might have moved the question of migration to the foreground of its disciplinary
machinery, but instead, the problem of constituting boundaries was deposited in
the background space of the right to exclude. Reinforcing this view of
international law’s limited appetite for antiracist regulation, the effort to promote
racial equality as an international ideal eventually diminished into an
individualized mode of antidiscrimination law. By the 1970s, the international
responsibility for racial equality was becoming the sole province of human rights.
Between World War II and the 1970s, international law’s association with the
antidiscrimination principle was not as markedly individualist as we think of it
today. For even while the antidiscrimination principle was being developed in the
early iterations of the UN’s International Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD) and on the administrative machinery of its Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), it was also pressed into the
service of the decolonization movement. But after decolonization peaked in
efforts like the project for a New International Economic Order, the
antidiscrimination principle shifted entirely into the familiar space of
international human rights law. Once understood as also a fixture of
decolonization’s social justice program, the antidiscrimination principle soon
reemerged in the individual rights regime. The problem of raciality generative of
peoples, and of racial discrimination waged against peoples, was morphing into a
problem of individual prejudice. Consequently, and for the most part, the concept
of antidiscrimination detached itself from the anticolonial mission and enrolled in
the newly energized international human rights movement.
This intellectual alliance between the generalized prohibition on racial
discrimination and international human rights law is a crucial feature of the
contemporary morph from modern to postracial ideology. It is here that we come
to see the hallmark of international law’s current race problem: by the time the use
of racial classifications merged with the “neutrality” of the antidiscrimination
principle, and work on the physical anthropology of race became increasingly
nebulous, cultural disagreement emerged as a primary focus of international legal
scholarship and practice. Racism and xenophobia dropped out of the
conversation, and now running riot at the border, lie in a blind spot, secluded from
international law’s field of vision. It is in this double foregrounding of
multiculturalism and its discontents on the one side, and the hegemony of the
antidiscrimination principle on the other, that the challenges of racism and
xenophobia slide into international law’s background. It is because of this double
maneuver that we often fail to see how the shift from the Family of Nations to the
United Nations did not delete the racially exclusionary practices of the nineteenth
century as much as it cut and pasted them at a different kind of borderland. It was
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here that a new ideology of inclusion busily worked its way up above, distracting
from a new ideology of exclusion, digging in below.
Why does this view of racial ideology in international law remain so
obscured? The answer is implicated in the development of a third and
contemporary phase of racial ideology, a postracial ideology which mystifies the
contemporary manifestation of the sovereign’s right to exclude. On the other side,
there is ideological justification for a contemporary vision of the right to exclude.
Postracial ideology shoulders both tasks: mystification and justification.
The purpose of this Article is to help explain the ideological preconditions for
postracial ideology in international law, but not the postracial structure itself. That
is, this Article lays out a prologue to the story of racial ideology in our own era of
international human rights law. In doing so, the Article begins with some
comments on methods of analysis. As I have said, the target in this inquiry is racial
ideology, and as I explain in Part I, I understand racial ideology as a legal
ideology—that is, as a mode of naturalizing juridical science. My aim is not to tell
an intellectual or social history of international law. I do not mean to suggest that the
concept of race or racial ideology is somehow the key variable that can explain
everything. My aim is more technical, which is to understand the racialized structure
of an ideological form of legal justification. Part I both clarifies the purpose of this
methodological approach, and hopefully avoids some misunderstandings about
what it is not. Part II turns to the classic mode of racial ideology in international law.
It looks to the international lawyer and U.S. statesman Elihu Root as exemplary of
its operation. The defining feature of the classic mode is its use as a mediating
device: As international lawyers and politicians assumed the classic liberal view of
sovereigns as free, equal, and independent, the question was how to justify the
frontiers of the community of rights-bearing sovereigns. Racial ideology
shouldered that task. Part III explores the mistaken premises of this conventional
narrative and explains why today’s lack of a racial approach to international law is
no accident. As the twentieth century began, nineteenth century fascinations with
phrenology and bloodline were slowly giving way to new advances in
anthropology, and the old science of racial classification was weakening. As a
result, many international lawyers argued for a retreat from the old Family of
Nations model, and a move forward toward an international law of racial equality.
In international legal thought, what emerged by the 1920s is what I call a modern
structure of racial ideology. On the one hand, racial discrimination was becoming
slowly disfavored at the level of international society. Rather than exclude
nonwhite peoples from the new international institutions, international law was
taking baby steps in its new embrace of an ideology of inclusion. All peoples were
believed to enjoy the right of international participation, eventually. On the other
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hand, this ideology of inclusion at the level of international institutions drew
attention away from a new ideology of exclusion digging in at the level of territorial
borders. While nineteenth century international law had largely abided by a
laissez-faire approach to migration, the League of Nations formed a new
international law of territorial exclusion that was entrenched by the U.S. Supreme
Court and Congress. This right to exclude individual people at the territorial
border, memorialized in the U.S. Immigration Act of 1924, became the gold
standard for sovereigns around the globe. Under the influence of a burgeoning
eugenics movement, this right to exclude individual people from domestic society
was decisively racial—and was the twentieth century update to the nineteenth
century’s right to exclude peoples from international society.
This is the great bait and switch: While a racial ideology of exclusion was
slowly giving way at the level of international institutions, it was reimagined at the
level of territorial borders and a regime of racialized migration governance. The
consequences of the displacement of a racialized right to exclude from the Family
of Nations to the sovereign border have been dramatic. Despite the fact that
support for the so-called plenary power to exclude migrants was drawn from
international law, and that the sovereign’s contemporary right to exclude is an
international rule, the very idea of racism in international law has gone right out
of sight. The reasons are many, but chief among them is the mainstream view
that racism does not exist as a structure of racial ideology, but instead exists as
acts of individual discrimination. And if racial discrimination is the problem,
human rights law is the answer. But this view of discrimination neither
understands the scope of today’s right to exclude, nor the racial ideology that
continues to sustain it.
Until we can better understand what became of international law’s classic
mode of racial ideology, and how it morphed into a modern structure, we will
continue to see international law’s race problem as entirely marginal—a problem
that does not really infect the discipline as much as it does individual agents. The
twenty-first-century transition into a postracial ideology is bad news: more
disastrous than the moderns, and more deceptive than the classics. At the same
time, the sovereign right to exclude seems more powerful than ever. In the first
decades of the twenty-first century, a generalized fear of foreigners—and
foreignness—is spinning out of control. At the least, here in the wake of a Trump
Administration run amok and a Biden Administration struggling at the border,
the sovereign right to exclude foreigners that was born in the crucible of modern
racial ideology appears revitalized. What’s more, the right of certain peoples to
exclude other peoples from the community of rights-bearing sovereigns looks to
be on the rise. To be sure, there is nothing yet that suggests the coming arrival of a
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new Congress of Vienna, with its explicit forms of legal hierarchy. And yet, this is
precisely what certain thinkers in the United States have recently been advocating
for in the context of the so-called War on Terror: While so-called great powers like
the United States ought to enjoy the full rights of sovereignty, peoples either
“unable” or “unwilling” to conduct themselves “rationally” on the world stage
should not.14 Startlingly, the sovereign’s right to exclude—both at the level of
territorial border control and at the level of sovereign-sovereign relations—is
more active than it has ever been in international legal history. If international
human rights law is the answer, so be it. But let it be reimagined.

I.

ON METHOD

While largely understudied, race has substantially influenced international
legal thought. Of course, this influence has been intensely diverse, and might be
analyzed in any number of arenas.15 In this Article, my focus is on the use of race
as a structure of argumentative practice, with race serving a powerfully
harmonizing purpose in the context of liberal legal thought.16 In brief, liberal
legalism begins in a contest with its Aristotelian predecessor, articulating a
baseline thesis of individual right against the Aristotelian theory of intelligible
essences.17 But this thesis of individual right cannot stand alone. It requires
political management, thus triggering a second liberal commitment to political
order. The problem in securing this form of order, however, is the persistent
question of equality. In the effort to tame the thesis of individual right, no one
group could naturally profit at the expense of another. The solution to this
problem is a third thesis in the language of liberal legal thought: the rule of law—or
naturalizing juridical science.18
In the classic From Apology to Utopia, Martti Koskenniemi outlined this
precise problem at the level of international legal thought, in which the demands

14.
15.
16.

17.
18.

See, e.g., JOHN YOO, POINT OF ATTACK: PREVENTIVE WAR, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL
WELFARE (2014).
For recent works, see, for example, EMPIRE, RACE, AND GLOBAL JUSTICE (Duncan Bell ed., 2019),
and CAROLA LINGAAS, THE CONCEPT OF RACE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2020).
My use of “structure of argumentative practice” draws heavily upon JUSTIN DESAUTELS-STEIN,
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF STYLE: A STRUCTURALIST HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRAGMATISM AND
LIBERAL LEGAL THOUGHT (2018), and Justin Desautels-Stein, International Legal Structuralism: A
Primer, 8 INT’L THEORY 201 (2016).
See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS (1975).
DESAUTELS-STEIN, supra note 16, at 10 (“In the context of liberal legal thought, naturalizing
juridical science holds that legislation is political and discretionary, that adjudication is
impersonal and constraining, and that in order to maintain this distinction, the work of
adjudication must prove a natural harmony between the imperatives of the first two theses.”).
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of freedom, order, and the rule of law recur.19 In this illustration of international
critical legal studies, Koskenniemi suggested that the legal concept of sovereignty
is stuck in a paradox if one only considers the conflicting demands of freedom and
order. To move past it, international lawyers harmonize the dissonance by way of
a process of intellectual mediation, namely a state’s tacit consent to the rule of law.
For instance, State A will argue against State B that it deserves the freedom to act in
furtherance of its self-preservation and that it is beholden to no rules to which it
has not given its consent. State B will argue against State A that if there is to be any
kind of meaningful international order, certain rules must constrain all sovereigns
in the choices that they make. These two claims about freedom and order—what
Koskenniemi calls ascending and descending patterns of argument—are mutually
exclusive so long as the whole structure is founded on an underlying premise of
sovereign equality: thus, the contradiction. The way to harmonize this apparent
tension between the demands of freedom and order is to suggest State A’s tacit
consent to the rule of law. Strictly speaking, and wholly in the abstract, this is a
nonracialized form of naturalizing juridical science.
I mention Koskenniemi’s important work in From Apology to Utopia in
order to distinguish a structure of argumentative practice in which equality
predominates from a structure of argumentative practice in which it does not.
Under Koskenniemi’s framework, the drive toward a mediating device like tacit
consent is motivated by the indispensable requirement that sovereigns consent to
the rules by which they are governed. Modifying consent so that it speaks at once
to the contrasting theses of freedom and order gives the appearance of harmony.
And this modification is the trick explored throughout From Apology to Utopia.
But the present question is not about how to harmonize the conflict between the
theses of freedom and order. It is rather about how to harmonize conflicts over the
scope or frontiers of that structure. Which groups participate in the liberal
structure of argument, and which are left out?20 As we will see momentarily—
unlike the approach taken by Koskenniemi—this is a racialized form of
naturalizing juridical science, or what I call racial ideology.
Of course, the question of who’s in and who’s out of the global order has been
among the central questions of postcolonial studies.21 For instance, in his
19.

20.
21.

MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ARGUMENT (2006). A classic statement of this view of sovereignty is reflected in EMER DE
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., Thomas Nugent
trans., 2008).
Notice that the question of participation here is not a question about the empirical realities of
the international legal order. It is rather a question of legal argument, and who is considered
deserving of engaging in this structure of legal argument.
See, e.g., KWAME NKRUMAH, NEO-COLONIALISM: THE LAST STAGE OF IMPERIALISM (1965).
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illuminating Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law,
Antony Anghie agreed that the traditional starting point in international legal
thought has been about how to justify the existence of rules that could bind
sovereign states.22 But Anghie argued that the quest to justify the limitation of that
question to only certain populations served as a guarantee for the rest of the
system, and that the relation between this limitation and the system’s making had
yet to be understood.23 For while it may have been true that the premise of
sovereign equality made it difficult to justify a legal order, Anghie pointed out that
the concept of sovereign equality came into being in a prefigured context of
domination and subordination. That is, the cultural character of sovereignty was
itself defined by the way international legal thought answered the question of
scope.24 This is Anghie’s well known theory of the dynamic of difference, in which
the sovereign form was defined by way of its cultural other.25
What is generally missing in the international law literatures of critical and
postcolonial studies, however, is an analysis of racial ideology and its legal
structures.26 To analyze the legal structure of racial ideology, and yet still remain
within the confines of From Apology to Utopia’s understanding of liberal
legalism, I retain the ideological focus on structures of mediation and
harmonization. But the mediating function is different in the context of
exclusion than in the context of equality. After all, if the claim from State A is
that they are a people with governing power over a specified territory, and that
this people understands itself as subject to no higher forms of legal or political
authority, it does not make much sense for State B to argue that State A has
impliedly consented to the rule that State A ought to be excluded from the family
of sovereign states. That is exactly the opposite of what they are saying. The device
of tacit consent is consequently too narrow to justify excluding certain peoples
from the structure itself.
Furthermore, while I follow Anghie’s lead in interrogating the cultural
constitution of sovereignty, I set aside Anghie’s dynamic of difference as it is too
22.
23.
24.

25.
26.

ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004).
Id. at 3–8.
There are many examples of the use of race as a means of exclusion throughout U.S. law, as well
as in international law. On the domestic side, critical race theory has done the most in pursuit
of the point. See, e.g., IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
(rev. ed. 2006); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV.
1 (1991). For helpful discussion of the point at a broader level, see THOMAS MCCARTHY, RACE,
EMPIRE, AND THE IDEA OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (2009).
ANGHIE, supra note 22, at 3–4.
Much of the current attention views race as peripheral to international legal thought. See, e.g.,
Martti Koskenniemi, Race, Hierarchy, and Legal Science: Lorimer’s Legal Science, 27 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 415 (2016).
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broad as an explanatory device. The dynamic of difference attends us-them
relations going back into antiquity, well before the invention of racial ideology. For
liberals working in the nineteenth century, something more than “positivism” was
required that might serve as a foundation for separating out an us from a them, and
it is here that race becomes a form of naturalizing juridical science in the liberal
hunt for harmonious justification for the gap between equality and exclusion. We
end up with a racial ideology the function of which is to justify: (1) a particular a
structure of rules; and (2) a structure of argumentative practice.
In a “classic” mode of liberal legal thought, sovereignty is premised on key
themes duplicated in the context of private property.27 Sovereignty is at its core
about autonomy and self-determination, distilled in the rule that all sovereigns
have the right to exclude other sovereigns from the places and communities they
call their own. This right to exclude, however, is necessarily indeterminate. Who
exactly gets to exclude who from where and from what? The answers quickly
multiply: There is the sovereign right to exclude other sovereigns from discrete
territories. There is the sovereign right to exclude other “sovereigns” from the
community of sovereigns. There is the sovereign right to exclude nonstate actors
from each of these separate domains. In the classic liberal style, these statements
about exclusion and sovereignty intertwine in the following rule: Only racially
superior populations of human beings are naturally able to achieve the legal status
of sovereignty, and it is only the sovereign state that may rightfully exclude other
sovereigns from its territory and community.28
As was argued repeatedly by nineteenth century jurists defending this
exclusionary effort, only racially superior sovereigns were bound by the laws of
territorial integrity and nonintervention.29 If a racially superior state sought to
use force on a territory belonging to a racially inferior people, the rules governing
the ensuing violence were purely “moral.”30 Thus, in the classic style of liberal
legal thought, the general argument began with the three theses of liberal legalism:
(1) freedom of right (for whom?); (2) ordered liberty (for whom?); and (3) a
harmonizing rule of law. Taken together, these three theses provide the basic

27.

28.
29.
30.

See, e.g., ANDREW FITZMAURICE, SOVEREIGNTY, PROPERTY AND EMPIRE, 1500–2000 (2014);
Justin Desautels-Stein, The Realist and the Visionary: On the Problem of Social Change in the
History of International Legal Thought, in CONTINGENCY IN THE COURSE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW COULD HAVE BEEN (Kevin Jon Heller & Ingo Venzke eds.,
forthcoming 2021).
For discussion of racial superiority and political status, see BAUM, supra note 10; HANNAFORD,
supra note 10.
See, e.g., PAINTER, supra note 11; STEPAN, supra note 11.
See, e.g., THEODORE D. WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 231–
33 (1860).

1550

67 UCLA L. R EV. 1536 (2021)

contours for the liberal concept of sovereignty. Next, restrict the presumption of
sovereign equality to a certain few: those peoples ranking as fully human. Finally,
these restrictions must be justifiable from within the borders of liberal theory, and
the empiricism of race science fit the bill perfectly.31 But this construction of the
racial sovereign is necessarily in the background, constituting the very idea of what
counts as a full participant in the international legal order.32
As a structure of argument, nineteenth century jurists deployed a racial
ideology for excluding those sovereigns enjoying the full arsenal of international
legal rights from those that did not. This strategy included the use of new legal
concepts like “the Great Powers” and “the Family of Nations.” And just as the
science of race emerged as a means for producing a hierarchy of value in human
classification,33 so too did it function to discriminate between those racially
superior states enjoying full international legal personality, and those that did
not.34 Importantly, this exclusionary effort did not simply mean that nonwhite
nations enjoyed fewer rights than the so-called white nations. It meant that when
nations attacking under cover of whiteness would invade those racially inferior
nations, the laws of war simply did not apply. Even more importantly, this form of
exclusion was indigenous to liberal theory, predicated on empirical epistemology
rather than religion or culture. Racial exclusion was justifiable because it was
knowable as natural science. And if it was knowable as natural science it was
knowable as legal science. The result is a working definition of a racial ideology: a
form of naturalizing juridical science in which patterns of argumentative practice
at once give structure to indeterminate legal concepts and justify relations of
domination through the use of seemingly neutral racial classifications.35
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On the early relation between empiricism and liberalism, see generally JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed.
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Buckle ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) (1748).
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(Austin Sarat ed., 2010).
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TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550–1812 (1968).
See TRAVERS TWISS, THE LAW OF NATIONS CONSIDERED AS INDEPENDENT POLITICAL
COMMUNITIES: ON THE RIGHT AND DUTIES OF NATIONS IN TIME OF PEACE 120 (1861). See also
the earlier discussion of “modified natural law” in DIETRICH HEINRICH LUDWIG VON OMPTEDA,
LITERATURE ON THE ENTIRETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, BOTH NATURAL AND POSITIVE (1785).
For more on ideology in the legal context, see Desautels-Stein and Rasulov, supra note 7. See
also DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1998).
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This emphasis on the ideological function of justification, and the role that
the science of racial categories has played in the process of circumscribing
liberalism, has much in common with Roland Barthes’s well-known analysis of
myth.36 As Barthes explained, a mythical ideology “has the task of giving a
historical intention a natural justification, and making contingency appear
eternal.”37 The principal figures in this process, Barthes continued, were
inoculation, tautology, and the privation of history.38 As discussed above, the story
of race science and the invention of whiteness deploy these figures systematically.
Indeed, racial ideology takes historical reality and gives the new concept of race a
natural orientation, covering up contingency with necessity.39 Racial ideology, in
this sense, depoliticizes in the service of rendering a history of slavery,
discrimination, exploitation, and destruction, as natural, neutral, and necessary, “a
harmonious display of [human] essences.”40 Barthes explained that the
exnomination of belief—the resistance to naming—is itself an indication of
ideological naturalization.
Diagnosing the mythology of the bourgeoisie, Barthes pointed to the various
registers in which that set of beliefs operates. At the economic level, there is little
in the way of denial. The economic system of the bourgeoisie was capitalism, plain
and simple. At the political level, things get murkier. There has never been a
“Bourgeois Party,” so named. But at the level of ideology, Barthes suggested,
bourgeois beliefs disappear completely. “The bourgeoisie has obliterated its
name . . . it makes its status undergo a real exnominating operation: the
bourgeoisie is defined as the social class which does not want to be named.”41
Ideological success, said Barthes, becomes knowable by way of a “locus of an
unceasing hemorrhage: meaning flows out of [the bourgeois] until [its] very name
becomes unnecessary.”42 This bleeding of the concept out and into every crevice
of the culture, just as the concept of race has done today, signals a naturalization of
the concept so powerful we could call it hegemonic. As Barthes continues:
[I]n a bourgeois culture, there is neither proletarian culture nor
proletarian morality, there is no proletarian art; ideologically, all that is
not bourgeois is obliged to borrow from the bourgeoisie. Bourgeois
ideology can therefore spread over everything and in doing so lose its
name without risk: no one here will throw this name of bourgeois back
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES 34 (Richard Howard & Annette Lavers trans., 2d ed. 2013).
Id. at 254.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 254.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 250.
Id.
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at it. It can without resistance subsume bourgeois theater, art, and
humanity under their eternal analogues; in a word, it can exnominate
itself without restraint when there is only one single human nature left:
the defection from the name bourgeois is here complete.43

Whereas mystification involves a hiding of ideology through a series of
argumentative techniques, legitimation involves the different work of
consolidating the ideology as not only a natural feature of social life (the way it is),
but a legitimate feature of social life (the way it ought to be). If ideology successfully
sheds its name in the way the snake sheds its skin, legitimation follows a similar
route. And so, Barthes notes:
[J]ust as bourgeois ideology is defined by the abandonment of the name
bourgeois, so myth is constituted by the loss of the historical quality of
things: in it, things lose the memory that they once were made. The
world enters languages as a dialectical relation between activities,
between human actions; it comes out of myth as a harmonious display of
essences. A conjuring trick has taken place; it has turned reality inside
out, it has emptied it of history and has filled it with nature, it has
removed from things their human meaning so as to make them signify
a human insignificance.44

What Barthes said of bourgeois ideology, we can now say of racial ideology.45
Of course, racial ideology offers different justifications in different places and
different times, a point one would be mistaken to treat carelessly. Indeed, not only
the justifications of racial ideology, but racism itself, are historically dependent,
varied in context.46 Nevertheless, I claim that racial ideology played a special role
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within the global context of liberal legal thought: to both produce and defend the
delimitation of liberalism to the circle of whiteness.47 Or to put this in Charles
Mills’s language, it is the function of racial ideology to rationalize and justify
liberalism in the register of the racial contract. Or as Anthony Farley has suggested,
the original moment of departure from the natural world was also a moment in
which the members of the new society who would be ruled were distinguished
from those who would rule it.48 If the racial contract required liberal justification,
or in other words, if the human mind desired a rationale for just why it was that all
human beings were not “full persons” after all, then the mark of science was the
answer.49 Or as Barbara Fields argued, “Racial ideology supplied the means of
explaining slavery to people whose terrain was a republic founded on radical
doctrines of liberty and natural rights . . . . Race explained why some people could
rightly be denied what others took for granted: namely, liberty, supposedly a self-
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IMPERIALISM 392 (Amy Kaplan & Donald E. Pease eds., 1993). On the contextualization of race
and racism, see, for example, Olindo De Napoli, Race and Empire: The Legitimation of Italian
Colonialism in Juridical Thought, 85 J. MOD. HIST. 801 (2013); George M. Fredrickson, Diverse
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evident gift of nature’s God.”50 Those who were marked could not be parties to the
social contract, members of the new society. “The masters come together as one
through the mark,” Farley continued, “After the mark, we are white-over-Black.”51
Curiously, while the story of this connection between racial ideology and
international law is not unknown in the international literatures of critical legal
studies and TWAIL, it is certainly underplayed. This absence may be the result of
a number of factors, but when taken together are rather complementary in
masking the contemporary presence of a racial ideology.
There are two general kinds of criticism here. First, there are those critics
disposed toward thinking of the international in terms of identity and domination
but see a singular focus on race as misguided in one way or another. For example,
some might see a focus on racial exclusion in the nineteenth century as something
of a nonstarter, since international law has since found its way out of that particular
mess: to substitute exclusion with inclusion. Our contemporary problems,
according to this view, are much broader and more complicated than the vulgar
racism of the past. Similarly, when it comes to the identity markers in question,
TWAIL scholarship in particular, and postcolonial theory in general, are often
more preoccupied with cultural prejudices rather than racial ones. Or, these
scholars would at least argue that some intersectional combination of vectors—as
opposed to a special focus on race—is the better bet.
Second, there are those critics for whom a focus on the structure of ideology
remains out of touch with reality. The more “concrete” preference is to seek out
the proper social, political, or economic contexts of international law. These
contexts might be rather narrow and particular, or very broad and general. In any
case, the mistake is to confuse the abstractions of international legal thought with
the grounded complexities of real power.52 I will briefly elaborate on each of these
criticisms—(i) the mistaken focus on race, and (ii) the mistaken focus on
ideological structure—and offer a synopsis of response.
Within the first family of criticisms, one reason provided for failing to
account for the history of racial ideology in international law is the sense that it is
an old problem with an obvious solution. In Boundaries of the International,
Jennifer Pitts provides a study of international legal thought very much in keeping
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with the spirit of this Article.53 As she explains, “the law of nations is Europe’s
distinctively successful solution to universal problems of order . . . especially
pernicious as a source of justifications for and obfuscations of European imperial
domination.”54 Shortly thereafter, Pitts explains that European imperialism is
sometimes characterized as a problem of exclusion, wherein a model of
sovereignty was first developed in Europe and then jealously kept there. On this
view, the solution was to expand the European system into an international
system, extending the benefits of sovereignty to the newly independent states.55
What is problematic about this framing—as Pitts rightly points out—is that
if the imperialism of international law is characterized as an initial form of
exclusion, and inclusion is then proffered as the remedy, we do not actually get
very far in dealing with the problem of domination and subordination in our
contemporary world.56 For one thing, non-Europeans were often “included” in
the arrangements of nineteenth century international law that were supposedly
exclusionary, as in the case of the much-discussed capitulation treaties.57 For
another, a more meaningful form of inclusion was the inspiration of much
twentieth century international legal thought, and even if we still have some ways
to go, the road to reform was laid long ago: If exclusion was the problem, the
League of Nations, and then considerably better, the United Nations, made great
strides beyond the Family of Nations. In this way, it would seem the problems of
racism and exclusionary practice go together, and so when the international legal
order became more inclusive in the second half of the twentieth century, it became
less racist as well. The contemporary architecture of the UN system, with its
Special Rapporteurs and the ICERD, seems to attest to this very point: Exclusion
and racism are hardly what they once were. As a result, the problem with focusing
on exclusion is two-sided: Either you miss the fact that outsiders were increasingly
included,58 or you miss the fact that this form of inclusion simply reproduced other
forms of domination and subordination.59
A second and related issue within the first family of criticisms concerns the
contemporary relationship between race and competing identity markers, such as
culture, ethnicity, nationality, and gender. If racism should not be a cause for
concern either because (a) it is no longer an international problem, or (b) it
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remains an international problem but no longer the problem it once was, scholars
argue that the same cannot be said about these other markers.60
As Mohammad Shahabuddin has ably explained, international legal thought
in the nineteenth century contested the role of ethnicity and culture, rather than
race. This contest is best characterized as between two traditions: the
Enlightenment and Romanticism.61 In each case, international lawyers reflected
contrasting visions of how to construct the nation state. In the Enlightenment
tradition, a European culture of rights and reason was expected to gradually
assimilate the rest of the non-European world, introducing the uncivilized into the
Family of Nations.62 In the Romantic tradition, culture was more hardwired into
the ethnic core of nations, thus serving as a more concrete barrier of religious,
linguistic, and racial constituencies.63 Sometimes, Shahabuddin explains, the
Enlightenment and Romantic traditions influenced vying views of the
international legal order, while at others the two views came together in a single
treaty.64 In any case, and what is of most relevance here, Shahabuddin emphasizes
that this conflict between traditions was a story about ethnicity and culture—race
was important in the broader scheme of prejudices, to be sure, but it never served
as a source of ideological justification, as ethnocultures did. Race was, in this view,
a more passive acted-upon object, while ethnoculture was doing all the heavy
lifting. And while race today seems far less problematic, the “clash of civilizations”
and the parade of “ethnic conflict” seems to see no end.
If historians like Pitts and Shahabuddin suggest a focus away from race in
their admirable examinations of international law’s empire, a different reason for
rejecting the history of racial ideology concerns the historian’s conventional way
of defining “context.”65 In their recent Rage for Order, Lauren Benton and Lisa
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Ford offer a criticism of this kind, arguing for histories of international law that
differ significantly from the approach of ideological structure.66 For Benton and
Ford, studying “Vattelian visions of sovereignty,” or the “articulation of a standard
of civilization from which certain colonial peripheries were tidily excluded,” is
largely just bad history.67 In fact, to better understand international law’s role in
the history of empire, historians should “look away from international law and
international lawyers”68 and toward a legal vernacular unlike anything found in
the works of a Johann Bluntschli or an Elihu Root. Rather than study the language
of international legal thought, Benton and Ford suggest that it would be better to
locate more concrete, on-the-ground contexts in which law actually formed and
made a difference.69 This orientation ought to lead the historian to hunt “men in
the middle,” “participants in a vernacular imperial constitutionalism with regional
variants and potentially global reach.”70 Unavailable in the “tomes of jurists” or
“the usual fixtures of the field,”71 this more realistic history of an imperial
international law is hardly “international law” at all: It is instead the fluid
vernacular of an imperial constitution, adopted and enforced in the professional
crannies of the British Empire. As Benton and Ford attest:
Outside the empire, Foreign Office officials, naval officers, and roving
bureaucrats collaborated to cast a thin skein of jurisdiction over oceans
by stretching municipal (domestic) law to its limit . . . . It was the
medium of multiple, parallel projects of imperial change . . . . [A]n
endemic and eclectic genre, and it was often a tedious one—the stuff of
long dispatches and arcane complaints, occasionally leavened by juicy
scandal. The traces of this story hide within the pages of untidy
commission reports, obscure manuals of colonial administration, and
hagiographies of law-minded governors.72

If this second reason for refuting the relevance of a “totalizing” structure of
racial ideology is about the more pressing need to canvass the complexities of the
vulgate, a related sort of complaint concerns a demand for a different sort of
contextualism. For whereas Benton and Ford study vernacular contexts, others
seek to understand international law in more macro-contexts, such as the
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politicoeconomic “reality” of the international system. For instance, in
International Law and World Order, B.S. Chimni argues for an “integrated”
approach to international law, one that incorporates Marxism, feminism, and
TWAIL.73 In the process of building this account, Chimni criticized earlier
versions of the structuralist approach offered in this Article, suggesting that the
reality of European power cannot be understood “by merely looking at the internal
structure of international law.”74 What is necessary instead is a treatment of the
historical and political contexts in which the structures of international law get
their meaning, in which the forces of capitalism bend law to its needs.75
Referencing the twin poles of freedom and order, Chimni continued, “[t]he reality
and ideology of universalizing capital configures and circumscribes the ideas of
autonomy and community in different ways in different eras.”76 Without
appreciating these extralegal contexts, thinkers in the structuralist tradition
remain in jeopardy of being “unwittingly incarcerated in a Eurocentric discourse
of international law.”77
A focus on the “reality” of the international system naturally leads to some
strange bedfellows, as the leftwing Chimni here finds an ally in the retroclassical
scholar John Yoo. Like Chimni, Yoo desires an international law more in tune
with the demands of power. The difference is that while they both see these
demands as the decisive variables, their prescriptions move in opposite directions.
Chimni desires a Third World/feminist/Marxist approach to international law’s
power dynamics. But in Point of Attack, Yoo’s argument for making international
law more responsive to the system’s power structure is not any of these things.
Instead, it is a fascinating piece of advocacy for a global increase in governmentsponsored killing.78 Yoo argues that as we move toward a contemporary
international law that encourages states he calls the “great powers” to use more
violence in foreign territories, international society will enjoy a total increase in
“global welfare.”79 It is not merely that international law would transform in the
effort to better legitimize the killing of the weak by the strong. Yoo suggests that
certain types of irrational states should be excluded from the same rights of
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violence enjoyed by the Great Powers.80 For example, while the United States will
be legally justified in the killing of suspected terrorists in Egypt, Egypt would be
legally barred from targeting individuals in U.S. territory, assuming Egypt had
determined that the United States was unable or unwilling to take action against
what Egypt understood to pose a substantial threat. As Kenneth Anderson
colorfully puts the idea:
States are not all the same . . . . No rational US leader is going to take the
solemn international law admonition of the “sovereign equality of
states” too seriously in these matters—and the United States has never
regarded a refusal to do so as contrary to international law but instead
as something built into international law as a qualification on the
reach of the “sovereign equality” of states. There will not be
“Predators over Paris, France,” any more than there will be “Predators
over Paris, Texas,” but Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and points beyond
are a different story.81

Thinkers like Yoo and Anderson suggest that the UN Charter’s theory of selfdefense and general approach to state-sponsored use of force is hopelessly
outdated in today’s world. In order to better increase global welfare, we need a new
international law that better incentivizes the use of force. This is in obvious
contrast to a system whose purpose is to keep the use of force to a minimum, if not
to abolish it completely. This type of argument suggests that if international law
better incentivized states to use force, terrorists would have fewer safe harbors in
the world and the lives of a majority of the world’s people would be better on the
whole. Yoo proposes that—rather than looking to the UN Charter and its rules of
self-defense—we are better served looking deeper into the past, to the Great
Powers system that emerged after the Congress of Vienna in 1815.82 That system,
Yoo believes, will replace the United Nations’s equality standard with an
exclusionary standard in which the Great Powers serve as global police, hunting
down and killing criminals. Those states not rational enough to warrant

Id. at 128. Yoo believes that the categories of “rogue” and “failed” state present different
calculations, but for all intents and purposes he treats them as “targeted states” in opposition
with the Great Powers. See id. Ultimately, such states become targets for war because they
simply cannot muster an effective government (that is, “unable”), or have an effective
government but one that is crazy or evil or both (that is, “unwilling). Yoo introduces the
concepts together in his welfare calculus. Id. at 112–17. See also ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASISTATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND THE THIRD WORLD (1990); RAWLS,
supra note 58.
81. Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing and Drone Warfare: How We Came to Debate Whether
There Is a ‘Legal Geography of War,’ in FUTURE CHALLENGES IN NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW
1, 10 (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2011).
82. See YOO, supra note 14, at 131–55.
80.
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membership in the Great Powers enjoy far fewer rights and are not presumed to be
legal equals. Yoo argues that the Great Powers system makes much more sense in
part because the UN system was established on the basis of an historical anomaly.
For Yoo, the architects of the League of Nations and UN were motivated by
attachments to medieval just war theory, which simply made no sense in the
context of twentieth century power politics.83 In other words, the move to
institutions that began in the early twentieth century was a mistake from the start,
building out of intellectual foundations that were simply anachronistic. The Great
Powers system of the nineteenth century, in conclusion, is the more realistic choice
for today.
Thus, the structural approach to racial ideology produces two general kinds
of anxiety. First is the view that either the problems once posed by racialized
exclusion have been solved, or if they have not, a focus on race alone is an
insufficient solution. Related to this first view is also the point that while race was
once an explicit feature of international law, the real problems for contemporary
international lawyers are better situated in the language of culture, if not a more
general intersectionality. Second, there is the view that a focus on ideological
structure misses the crucial contexts in which these ideologies gain their traction
and meaning. These contexts might take us away from international legal thought
altogether and toward the legal vernacular, or they might take us into the more
general territory of power politics and the global economy. In any case, the
problem here is that absent sufficient emphasis on the right context, a structural
analysis will not adequately reflect the international system’s historical reality.
These are all important concerns, and in the space of this Article I cannot
hope to give them the attention they demand. But I can offer some brief and
provocative—though hopefully not too provocative—responses. With respect to
the first family of complaints about the contemporary relevance of racial
exclusion, Pitts is right to echo the postcolonial insight that if one frames
international law’s empire as a problem of exclusion, the natural next step seems
to be a turn to inclusion, and that this “next step” is seriously ill-equipped.84 To
think as much is to misunderstand how the powerful dominate the powerless, even
after the powerless are included. I agree wholeheartedly, and this is why I treat
racial exclusion as a morphing ideology in liberal legal thought. If the treatment
were to end with a statement on the logics by which the peoples of the world have
been excluded from the full ambit of international rights, the shifting patterns of
argument found among the moderns might very well come off as the progressive
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denouement of an ugly period in international legal history. But that is not the
story. As I argue below, it is precisely in the context of a more inclusive structure
of racial ideology that international law transformed in the middle decades of the
twentieth century. As I will suggest in the context of modern liberalism, racial
ideology morphed into a different structure of naturalizing juridical science. At
the level of the law of sovereigns, race receded as a means for excluding other
peoples from the realm of international legal personality. But while the demise of
a racialized logic of exclusion actively foregrounded the prohibitive work of the
antidiscrimination principle, race simultaneously fortified a twinned right of
exclusion for sovereigns seeking to control their borders. As I argue elsewhere,
racial ideology later morphed at this juncture, entering into an alliance with a
postmodern pragmatism and yielding a contemporary form of postracial ideology
in international legal thought.85 All of this is to say that I am fully sympathetic with
the concern about the study of racial exclusion as leading to a dead end. My
response to this is simply that rather than seeing exclusion as masking the reality
of domination, one ought to see the right to exclude—a result of this morphed
form of racial ideology—as both producing the very idea of the racial subject, as
well as sustaining racial hierarchy right up to the present.
With respect to the related concern about raising racial analysis over the
study of culture, I have been heavily influenced here by the literature on
neoracism.86 In a word, while I wholeheartedly endorse the TWAIL emphasis on
cultural subordination as a crucially important variable, I also see the elevation of
cultural studies as a moment in which a new and subversive form of raciality has
come to thrive behind the scenes. What’s more, while I am in complete agreement
with the theory of intersectionality as key for understanding the breadth of the
international legal order, I also see the emphasis on that breadth as coming at a
cost. That cost is what we sometimes lose in terms of understanding the very
peculiar function of race in constituting our patterns of justification.
With respect to the second family of complaints, I am certainly attentive to
the necessity of “context.” Indeed, the study of “ideology” in international legal
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thought might seem to be just the sort of old intellectual history that is now well
behind the times.87 It was twenty years ago that Susan Marks was positioning her
own work on ideology as outdated, pointing to the “end of ideology” theorists on
the one side and the postmoderns on the other, all of whom were arguing for the
lack of use in the study of “ideology.”88 For the end of ideology camp, ideology
reflected a kind of worldview that had simply gone out of style, while for the
postmoderns, ideology reflected a kind of totality that never was. It is certainly fair
to say that in the decades since Marks’s publication, the study of “ideology” has
remained—at best—a peripheral exercise.
Nevertheless, I remain wholly persuaded that Marks was on the right track
and that a structural approach to racial ideology is sorely missing in today’s
international law debates. I believe this is so for the reasons just mentioned
regarding the salience of race and neoracism. Further, the study of ideology can
also serve as a mode of contextualist historiography. Consider the critiques of
Benton, Ford, Chimni, and Yoo at the level of historical method. While the
particular contexts in which they study international law differ greatly, and while
their proposals differ even more, they all share the view that whatever language
there is in international legal thought, it must be understood in some context
outside of or external to that language. That is, it would be a mistake to study the
language without a context in which to place it, whether that be the
correspondences of English imperialists in the nineteenth century, the nature of
capitalism in the twentieth, or the prospects of bioterrorism in the twenty-first.
These contexts have their place, and in various respects they all are edifying.
But understanding international law in the context of racial ideology is just as
contextualist as any of these methods. It is a mistake to believe that because the
context of racial ideology is somehow internal to international law, it is therefore
illegible as a proper context in which to understand international law’s history.
What’s more, the whole business of characterizing certain contexts as external to
law and therefore more edifying seems largely unhelpful:89 The dismissal of
ideology-critique as irrelevant to the “real” contexts of international law must
rest on something more substantial than a flimsy internal-external distinction.
If we are to blind ourselves to the contexts of racial ideology in international
legal thought, it must be because there is really nothing to see. And I submit that
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if you believe there is nothing to see in the structure of racial ideology, you need
to keep reading.
In sum, my claim about the context of racial ideology in international legal
thought is as follows: In international law a classic mode of racial ideology
generated a legal conception of sovereignty through a process of racial subjection,
as universal and always already delimited by the lights of a naturalizing science of
racial classification. A modern mode of racial ideology, in contrast, interprets the
legal concept of sovereignty as universal, and justifies its expanding application to
nonwhite peoples by the lights of a social science understanding of racial
classification. At the same time, in smuggling classic racial ideology away from the
formal apparatus of international society, modern racial ideology instantiates the
classic form of racial subjection at a different borderland, one between members of
a national community and the “other.” Modern racial ideology, as a result, is twosided. It slowly develops a sense of racial equality and inclusion at the level of
sovereign-sovereign relations, but also naturalizes a racialized right of individual
sovereigns to exclude outsiders from the national community.
In what follows I offer a short synopsis of each of these racial ideologies. The
story of postracial ideology in the era of international human rights is yet to come.

II.

CLASSIC RACIAL IDEOLOGY: EXCLUDING PEOPLES
FROM INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

Throughout the nineteenth century, racial ideology fueled the sovereign’s
right to exclude. In the language of international law, this exclusionary ideology
was an engine for legal justification that operated at the level of sovereign states.
Empowered by this type of justification, the concept of the Family of Nations
rested on the right of sovereigns to exclude peoples from the community of
sovereigns.90 The relevant polis was global, and the task of what I am calling classic
racial ideology was to justify and naturalize the rights of so-called racially superior
peoples to exclude so-called racially inferior peoples from the circle of so-called
rights-bearing sovereigns. This sovereign right of exclusion was not characterized
as a right to exclude individuals from a particular territory: Between recognized
sovereigns—such as within the Family of Nations—migration was easy and
open.91 It was not until the twentieth century that the border controls of today were
justified by a sovereign right to exclude. Before this, sovereign rights of exclusion
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were focused on keeping entire peoples out of the Family of Nations, and not on
keeping individual migrants out of a territory.
To appreciate the transformations that occurred in international legal
thought at the turn of the twentieth century, let us quickly recall that in 1823, then
U.S. President James Monroe proclaimed the right of independence enjoyed by
Spain’s former colonies in the Americas.92 What precisely was this right of
independence to mean? Was it an affirmation of sovereign equality, rights of legal
personality and full participation in the Family of Nations? In the 1820s the United
States was still a peripheral sovereign in the international legal order, and it
remained unclear what right the United States had to participate in the Family of
Nations, much less what rights were due to the racially diverse and openly
rebellious peoples occupying the rest of North and South America.93
What was very clear, however, was the U.S. interest in preventing European
conquest in the Western Hemisphere. By 1845, the United States annexed Texas
from Mexican control, and a few years later the Mexican-American War was in
full bloom. By the end of the conflict, Mexico had lost half of its territory to the
United States. And by the turn of the twentieth century, the United States was in a
curious position with respect to the legacy of the Monroe Doctrine. With its
imperialist adventures in Panama, Cuba, and the Philippines, could the United
States offer respect for an international rule of sovereign equality, with anything
resembling a straight face? From the perspective of many international lawyers
and politicians in South America, the results of the Spanish-American War were
racially motivated. The United States was no defender of sovereign equality. It was
a bully and a bigot.
As the Argentine international lawyer Alejandro Alvarez would later explain,
what needed clarifying was the separation between the Monroe Doctrine, as it had
crystallized into a rule of customary international law, and the hegemonic and
imperialist policies of the United States. What the Monroe Doctrine was “really”
about, according to Alvarez, was the recognition of “acquired rights to
independence, to non-intervention, and to non-colonization on the American
92.
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continent.”94 In contrast were U.S. policies which contradicted this commitment
to sovereign equality:
During the nineteenth century the United States built up alongside of
this Doctrine a personal policy, which does not represent the interest of
the continent, but quite the reverse; wherefore it inspires fear rather
than sympathy in the states of Latin America. This so-called policy of
hegemony or supremacy consists in intervention by the United States,
on behalf of its own interests, in the domestic affairs of certain states in
Latin America . . . .95

Nevertheless, Alvarez further suggested that the sovereign right of
nonintervention could go only so far; if “civilization” demands a sovereign to abide
by certain changes occurring in the international order, the fundamental right of
the state to independence should give way.96 Alvarez explained:
[A] State may not, on the ground that it is absolutely independent,
isolate itself entirely from the other States or refuse to enter into
relations with them. The great Powers have compelled certain Asiatic
States to open their doors to European commerce, and this action has
been approved by the whole civilized world.97

In the encounter with Latin American jurists like Alvarez, a legal task before
the United States in the wake of new imperial control over the Philippines, Cuba,
and Puerto Rico, was one of justification.98 If Alvarez was right, and the Monroe
Doctrine stood above all else for a standard of sovereign equality, what legal
justifications might warrant U.S. action everywhere from Panama to Hawaii?
Indeed, this was precisely the concern motivating President William McKinley in
his decision to appoint the New York lawyer Elihu Root as his Secretary of War.99
Later to become a President of the American Society of International Law,
Theodore Roosevelt’s Secretary of State and Secretary of War, as well as a Chair of
several of Andrew Carnegie’s corporate entities, McKinley’s charge to the man that
would become his international law czar was to justify the U.S. record abroad.
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In the years before World War I, Root gave an array of public lectures both in
the United States and throughout Latin America. Root repeatedly agreed with
Alvarez that the principle underlying the Monroe Doctrine was “the right of every
sovereign state to protect itself,” where “each state must judge for itself when a
threatened act will create such a situation.”100 Root continued:
The fundamental principle of international law is the principle of
independent sovereignty. Upon that all other rules of international law
rest. That is the chief and necessary protection of the weak against the
power of the strong. Observance of that is the necessary condition to
the peace and order of the civilized world. By the declaration of that
principle the common judgment of civilization awards to the smallest
and weakest state the liberty to control its own affairs without
interference from any other Power, however great.101

Two years later, Root addressed the American Society of International Law
regarding a recently adopted declaration on the equality of nations.102 That
declaration espoused that “[e]very nation is in law and before law the equal of
every other nation . . . ,” and Root forcefully set this principle against the example
of the warring states of Europe.103 At the same time, however, Root cautioned that
this move toward a more fulsome sense of legal equality had to be realistic if it was to
be effective.104 Commenting approvingly of Root’s “masterful” view of sovereign
equality, Alvarez explained that what Root was talking about could not be the
absolute equality of states, subjecting the more powerful to various
kinds of restraint. The equality that must be established . . . is legal
equality, by virtue of which no state may, merely because of its
superiority, have any claim or pretention to rights which are not
recognized as belonging to weaker states. All states must be equal before
the law.105

The point that needs to be emphasized here as we search for the coming
transition into a modern form of racial ideology, is that while Root and Alvarez
agreed on the need to consider Latin American sovereigns as equal members of the
Family of Nations, they also agreed that this commitment to sovereign equality for
states meant very little for the equality of the human races. Not every people, in
other words, deserved a sovereign state and a legal position in the Family of
100. Elihu Root, The Real Monroe Doctrine, 8 AM. J. INT’L L. 427, 432 (1914).
101. Id. at 434.
102. Elihu Root, Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations Adopted by the American Institute
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Nations. In Alvarez’s “Latin America and International Law,” for example, he
argued for the importance of understanding the racial composition of the Latin
American population.106 Unlike the “single race” of “whites” in Europe, Alvarez
pointed in South America to the “conquering race” from Spain, the “negroes
imported from Africa,” and the creoles, those children born in Latin America from
European-born parents.107 Among these groups, the only “thinking” part of the
population was the creole: The Spanish whites and the Africans either thought of
Latin America as just another piece of Europe, or didn’t think at all.108 Indeed, in
the course of Spanish-American independence and the various congresses and
conventions that emerged in the first third of the nineteenth century, the
political construction of the new sovereigns was highly racialized.109 The bottom
line: While the new Latin American sovereigns would come to take a marginal
place within the Family of Nations, this was participation only for racially
recognizable sovereigns.
In the context of Root’s work in the effort to elect Theodore Roosevelt, Root
argued for a racial approach to equality from a different direction. Anticipating
Alvarez’s criticism of U.S. imperialism in the Western hemisphere, the
Democratic Party’s political platform at the turn of the century regarded the
paramount issue in the presidential election to be that of “imperialism.”110 To be
sure, Root abided by a classic racial ideology by arguing in favor of sovereign
equality for small and great states alike. But was it imperialist for the United States
to deny sovereign prerogatives to the Filipino people if they did not have the
capacity for self-governance? As Spain conceded control of the Philippines to the
United States in 1899, ought the United States to have recognized the Filipino
people as an independent sovereign, naturally endowed with rights of
nonintervention and independence? Or, as Root framed the question, ought the
United States to have regarded as sovereign equals a “tribe” under the leadership
of a “Chinese half-breed”?111 “Is there anything in the circumstances of the
assistance which we have received from these men which entitles them to the
reward of the sovereignty of the Philippines?”112 Root’s reply: “Nothing can be
more preposterous than the proposition that these men were entitled to receive
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from us sovereignty over the entire country which we were invading.”113 Only
“Oriental treachery” might convince one otherwise.114
Root’s suggestion was that like the American Indians, presumably not only
those indigenous peoples living in the United States but those all throughout the
Americas, the Filipino people ought to have realized that they enjoyed no
entitlements over territory as against the United States.115 It is true, Root conceded,
that democracies enjoy legitimacy from the consent of the people. But “[n]othing
can be more misleading,” Root cautioned, “than a principle misapplied.”116 If
government arises among a people capable of making “free, intelligent and
efficacious decisions,” then surely the government must be by and for that
people.117 But Root asserted that the people of the Philippines were not of this
stock, and simply “incapable of self-government.”118 To put this another way, did
the United States have a right to exclude the Filipino people from sovereign status
in the international legal order? Armed with a clear-cut racial ideology of
hierarchy, Root’s answer was not merely that the United States was justified in
excluding the Filipino people from the community of sovereigns. Rather, the
United States was under an international legal obligation to do so, given the lack of
racial competence rampant in the Philippines.
Of course, the point here is not to single out Root for a racist perspective on
the U.S. war in the Philippines.119 Rather, the purpose is to illuminate a classic form
of racial ideology in international legal thought, which was hardly restricted to a
few elite lawyers. As Will Smiley has explained, “the war had been accompanied
by fierce racist sentiments among Americans.”120 And these were not only the
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1903, 36 LAW & HIST. REV. 511, 511 (2018). I should note that Smiley’s thesis here is that it is a
mistake to believe that the United States denied the applicability of jus in bello to the Philippines
on racial grounds. Rather, Smiley suggests, “United States officers reinterpreted the law so that
it could simultaneously demonstrate their moral and cultural superiority, while also
authorizing widespread summary violence.” Id. at 514. To be clear, my claim is not that
international lawyers like Root were suggesting that the Philippines was terra nullius, and that
international law did not apply. It is rather that, insofar as the Filipino people might have had
a right to participate in the Family of Nations with the full rights of international legal
personality, racial ideology played a critical role in justifying the U.S. effort to exclude the
Philippines from that status of free and equal participation. The extent to which international
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sentiments of the American public; military officers engaged in questions about the
applicability of the laws of war consistently relied on a racial ideology of inferiority to
justify unusually violent allowances for the United States in its suppression of a
“backward” race.121

III.

MODERN RACIAL IDEOLOGY: EXCLUDING PEOPLE
FROM NATIONAL COMMUNITIES

In his attempt to justify a particular understanding of sovereign equality in
international law, we can see how Root structured an essentially indeterminate
sovereignty concept by at once opening its application universally and restricting
its application to racially superior peoples. This is a classic mode of racial ideology,
naturalizing what is a historically contingent argument about sovereignty by way
of an appeal to the science of racial classification. What I turn to now, however, is
Root’s deployment of a modern mode of racial ideology, in contrast with the classic
mode explored above. As I explain in the remaining pages, modern racial ideology
in international legal thought arose in the midst of a tremendously effective bait
and switch.122
To best understand this transition, we should start with what were at the time
two separate views of racial equality. The first kind was the weakening of the right
to exclude peoples from international society, and which slowly gained ground as
the Family of Nations model gave way to the new League of Nations. This
weakening led to the rise of a formal equality of sovereigns to participate in
international society, and in particular, in the new international institutions. And
then there was a second kind of racial equality, distinct from the equality due to
sovereigns operating in international society. This was a view of racial equality
regarding prohibitions on the rights of states to exclude individuals from entry into
a national political community, and the enjoyment of certain freedoms once
law might morph in its racially coded application is precisely what Smiley describes—a process
similar to that described by Teemu Ruskola regarding Caleb Cushing’s work toward the Treaty
of Wanghia. See Teemu Ruskola, Canton Is Not Boston: The Invention of American Imperial
Sovereignty, 57 AM. Q. 859, 860–61 (2005). But I want to clarify that interpretation and
justification are not only in play when it comes to the application of international rules, for as
this Article argues, exclusion of peoples from international society also requires interpretation
and justification. If it did not, exclusion would merely and only be political.
121. Smiley, supra note 120, at 537–38, 542.
122. The language of “bait and switch” is not meant to suggest a conscious or intentional effort to
deceive on the part of any particular actor. More accurately, I refer to the tactics of
mystification and naturalization endemic to ideological production at the level of social and
legal structure. See generally KENNEDY, supra note 35; GEORG LUKÁCS, HISTORY AND CLASS
CONSCIOUSNESS: STUDIES IN MARXIST DIALECTICS (Rodney Livingstone trans., Merlin Press Ltd.
1971) (1968); FREDERIC JAMESON, ALLEGORY AND IDEOLOGY (2019).
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inside. In a word, this view of racial equality would have called for the emergence
of an international migration law capable of regulating the rights of sovereigns to
control their borders. But while classic racial ideology justified the rights of
sovereigns to exclude other sovereigns from their territories and from
international society, modern racial ideology justified the rights of sovereigns to
exclude individual people from their territories and from the national community.
The bait and switch in international legal thought concerns a simultaneous
fading of the classic mode, and emergence of the modern mode: While an
ideology of inclusion was taking center stage at the level of international
institutions, an ideology of exclusion was animating the emerging international
law of migration.123
As the architecture of the League of Nations came together, international
lawyers agreed about how ineffective the new international institutions would be
if they remained caught up in the old racial hierarchies of the nineteenth century.124
These lawyers believed that whatever their racial inferiorities, all sovereigns should
join the League, either as full members or as “members in training.”125 The
question was whether this weakening of classic racial ideology suggested an open
attitude toward migration, to the inclusion of racially diverse residents in national
communities. Or was that weakening only relevant to the inclusion of racially
diverse peoples in the international community? In response to a query for his
feedback on the issue, Root told the American delegates in Versailles to oppose any
language that pushed the idea of racial equality beyond the level of sovereignsovereign relations. To do otherwise, Root counseled, would suggest a “plan for
unlimited yellow immigration.”126 As Root had written earlier, “[w]ith the great
123. See generally MARILYN LAKE & HENRY REYNOLDS, DRAWING THE GLOBAL COLOUR LINE: WHITE
MEN’S COUNTRIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGE OF RACIAL EQUALITY (2008); ADAM M.
MCKEOWN, MELANCHOLY ORDER: ASIAN MIGRATION AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF BORDERS
(2008); PETER SAHLINS, BOUNDARIES: THE MAKING OF FRANCE AND SPAIN IN THE PYRENEES
(1989); PETER SAHLINS, UNNATURALLY FRENCH: FOREIGN CITIZENS IN THE OLD REGIME AND
AFTER (2004); JOHN C. TORPEY, THE INVENTION OF THE PASSPORT: SURVEILLANCE, CITIZENSHIP,
AND THE STATE (2d ed. 2018); RACIAL PROFILING AND BORDERS: INTERNATIONAL,
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Jeff Shantz ed., 2010).]
124. See, e.g., EDWIN DEWITT DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1920);
Alpheus Henry Snow, International Law and Political Science, 7 AM. J. INT’L L. 315 (1913).
125. The phrase “member in training” conceals far more than it explains. As has been ably
discussed, the mandate system was best understood as merely a new name for an older system
of domination and subordination. As Mark Mazower has detailed, the mandate system was in
large part the brainchild of Jan Smuts. MARK MAZOWER, NO ENCHANTED PALACE: THE END OF
EMPIRE AND THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 48 (2009); see also ANGHIE,
supra note 22.
126. LAKE & REYNOLDS, supra note 123, at 292–93. See also Elihu Root, The Proposed Convention for
a League of Nations: Letter to the Chair of the Republican National Committee, March 29, 1919,
5 INT’L CONCILIATION 694 (1919).
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varieties of race and custom and conceptions of social morality in the human
family the right of each nation to conduct its own internal affairs according to its
own ideas is the essence of liberty.”127 Racism should not bar a sovereign state from
being left alone to organize its own affairs—this was a version of the principle of
self-determination Wilson was promoting. At the same time, notions of racial
equality could not tell sovereigns how to do the organizing.
Indeed—and certainly in the United States—migration was increasingly
seen as an issue best regulated by a sovereign’s right to exclude, rather than by
treaty.128 Root elaborated on what he saw as the appropriate balance in a passage
that would seem alien to the perspectives of today’s conservative politicians,
explaining that it was essential for all sovereigns to abide by the procedures and
decisions of international arbitrations and adjudications. Importantly, this
included the United States; every nation, regardless of its economic, military, or
cultural achievements, ought to submit their claims to international law and its
attendant mechanisms for conflict resolution. This was a key for avoiding future
wars, and Root thought that the League covenant did not go far enough in making
the rules for international dispute resolution more effective.129 In this sense, all
sovereign peoples were equals in the eyes of international law.
But while the United States shared an interest with all other sovereigns in
promoting a more effective and functional international law, it shared no interests
at all in promoting the racial equality of individual human beings. Choices about
how to constitute and police the membership and boundaries of the new
international community was a question for the new League; in contrast, questions
about the membership of a sovereign’s own political and national community
were “purely American affairs” and to be determined solely by domestic policy.130
As Root explained, “The nations of Europe in general are nations from which
emigrants go. The United States is a nation to which immigrants come . . . Europe
and America are bound to look at questions of emigration and immigration from

127. Root, supra note 92, at 216; see also Erik A. Moore, Imperial International Law: Elihu Root
and the Legalist Approach to American Empire, ESSAYS IN HIST. (2013),
http://www.essaysinhistory.com/imperial-international-law-elihu-root-and-thelegalist-approach-to-american-empire/#_ftn13 [https://perma.cc/87DY-7LXD].
128. MCKEOWN, supra note 123, at 318 (taking a view regularly promulgated by the Immigration
Restriction League, of which Root was a member); see also Chae Chan Ping v. United States,
130 U.S. 581 (1889); Frederic Megret, A Road Not Taken: Open Borders, The Human Right to
Immigrate and the History of International Law, in CONTINGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Ingo Venzke ed.) (forthcoming 2021); Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese
Exclusion Cases: The Plenary Power Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10
ASIAN L.J. 13 (2003).
129. Root, supra note 126, at 706–07.
130. Id. at 709.
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different points of view . . . .”131 There was simply no connection—as Root
understood it—between accepting on the one hand that the United States would
subject itself to international regulation by new institutions in the service of
fostering world peace and the end of war, and accepting on the other hand that the
League would be able to intervene in questions related to the right of the United
States to exclude certain kinds of people from its borders.132 From Root’s outlook,
international migration law simply could not exist. As a result, Root suggested that
the United States qualify its entrance into the League with an amendment reading
in part, “the representatives of the United States of America sign this convention
with the understanding that nothing therein contained shall be construed to imply
a relinquishment by the United States of America of its traditional attitude toward
purely American questions . . . (including therein the admission of immigrants), to
the decision or recommendation of other powers.”133
So what exactly was going on here? Why were the framers of the League
Covenant so anxious about an affirmation of racial equality as relevant to
migration questions, and yet potentially open to questions about legal personality
in the international community? As so many international lawyers in the United
States and Europe recognized, international law’s race problem was shifting away
from sovereign-sovereign relations and toward the question of whether a new field
of international migration law might come to regulate a sovereign’s decisions
about border control.
At the time, the idea that sovereigns enjoyed a right to exclude individual
migrants was new to the international legal order. As international lawyers had
explained for centuries, a sign of fluency with the Law of Nations was an open
border between states.134 Nominally, and certainly by the nineteenth century, the
status of sovereignty in the Family of Nations signaled an appreciation of open
migration as commercial intercourse. In this respect migration was often
understood as merely a facet of the laissez-faire world of civilized legal relations.
That said, the legal establishment of racial borders was not unknown. Likely the
most vivid example in opposition to the “free movement” regime of the Family of
Nations was the situation for free African Americans in the antebellum United
States. As Kunal Parker has explained, for whatever the reality of other
international pressures that might have pushed against a sovereign’s choice to

131.
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133.
134.

Id. at 710.
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Id. at 716.
The idea is present as early as in the writings of Francisco Vitoria, one of the so-called founding
fathers of international law. See Francisco De Vitoria, On the American Indians, in POLITICAL
WRITINGS 277 (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991).
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adopt national immigration control, at least in the United States the arrival of a
national immigration law was held in abeyance for as long as individual states
feared a loss in the rights to exclude African Americans from their territories. It
was only after the Civil War and the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment that
slavery’s block on a national immigration law finally caved in. But rather than the
inclusionary ethos of radical reconstruction, it was precisely the slave states’
racialized right to exclude that rose to prominence in the now-national context of
migrant exclusion. Thus, while the Fourteenth Amendment of 1868 had cleared
domestic obstacles for a national immigration law, it was only fourteen years later
that Congress adopted the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.135
After World War I, the movement toward a national immigration regime and
its attendant hostility toward Asians and new immigrant groups from Europe came
into contact with the universalizing push for the new League of Nations.
Immigration was increasingly viewed as a social problem demanding application of
the best available, cutting-edge social science. How should the United States
approach the tremendous influx of persons moving into its territory? Thinking
about migration as free commercial intercourse did not make sense; it had not
really ever made sense, at least in the United States, considering the situation first
for freed slaves and then Chinese immigrants. But now, with such an increase in
migration from southeastern Europe, how could a new migration law best meet
the country’s social need? The answer was eugenics.136
Through the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 (the Act),137 and inspired by a
congressionally sponsored commission tasked with studying the science of race
and migration, the United States established a domestic form of border control
that bore all the marks of classic racial ideology. It was hierarchical, exclusionary,
and rooted in a science of race. As Mae Ngai has written, “In a sense, demographic
data was to twentieth century racists what craniometric data had been to race
scientists during the nineteenth. Like the phrenologists who preceded them, the
eugenicists worked backward from classifications they defined a priori and
declared a causal relationship between the data and race.”138 The Act quickly went
global, inspiring sovereigns around the world to implement the newly forged and
internationally ensconced right to exclude. As Adam McKeown has argued,
“Institutions that had their origins in exceptional methods necessary to preserve

135. Pub. L. No. 47-126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882).
136. See DESMOND KING, MAKING AMERICANS: IMMIGRATION, RACE, AND THE ORIGINS OF DIVERSE
DEMOCRACY (2000).
137. Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153 (1924).
138. MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA
31–32 (rev. ed. 2014) (2004).
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the ideals of self-government from the threats of an uncivilized world had now
become indispensable technologies of population management. Their adoption
became a prerequisite for recognition as a self-determining state in the
international system.”139 The Act became the international gold standard for
migration regulation.140 “It was the potent mix of race and self-rule that built a
world of border control.”141
These developments were entirely foreseen in Root’s assault on the racial
equality clause that never made it into the League Covenant. The racial ideology
of inclusion that was rising in the context of sovereign participation in the
international legal order was, at least in part, actively assisted by a racial ideology of
exclusion at the level of the sovereign right to exclude migrants. That is, just as
classic racial ideology appeared to weaken at the formal level of sovereign relations,
it was reemerging in another disciplinary field. No longer the guardian of the
border between the international community and racially inferior peoples, classic
racial ideology moved forward as the justification for a right of sovereigns to police
their territorial borders, guarding the border between the national community and
racially inferior people. But this bait and switch not only helped lay the ideological
conditions for the Act. It also helped to ensure that the field of international
migration law would arrive stillborn. Rather than launch a field of regulation
governing the entry of individuals at sovereign borders, the bait and switch
relegated the vast majority of the legal terrain to the sovereign right to exclude. The
remnants, now regarded as exceptions to the general rule of sovereign prerogative,
were eventually given over to the new and exceptional field of refugee law.
What I hope is coming into focus here is the interplay between two separate
international law narratives that have yet to be properly understood together. On
one side is the “triumph” over a classic racial ideology, whereby the colonized
world very slowly entered the field of newly independent states. This is a story of
the decline of a racialized right to exclude “inferior” peoples from the community
of sovereign states. On the other side is the transition from a moment in
international law when migration between members of the Family of Nations was
relaxed and relatively fluid, and ripe for the emergence of a new regime of
international migration law, to a later moment in which the sovereign right to
exclude manifests in the xenophobic context of a plenary power over border
control. This is the story of the ascendance of a racialized right to exclude
“inferior” individuals from a sovereign’s national political community. These two

139. MCKEOWN, supra note 123, at 319–20.
140. See id. at 334.
141. Id. at 213.
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narratives are deeply intertwined, in the sense that what we see here is the
morphing of racial ideology in international law—what we have typically come
to see as the eclipse of classic racial ideology—actually shifting into another
disciplinary terrain. This is the transformation from classic racial ideology into
the modern: an entrenchment of a racialized right to exclude at the territorial
border made possible by an emerging ideology of inclusion at the level of
international society. This dynamic would come to be governed by the
antidiscrimination principle of human rights law: What once was called
“racism” would become repackaged as “cultural diversity.”
CONCLUSION
The international law of the nineteenth century was in a pickle. On one side,
a traditional view of sovereignty had developed, as analogized to that famous
resident of the “state of nature”: the rights-bearing individual of liberal political
theory. Just as that individual was born free and equal, naturally endowed with
certain rights, so too were sovereign states free to determine their national destinies.
The very idea of sovereignty entailed rights of equal autonomy and
nonintervention for all. On the other side, however, and after the end of the
Napoleonic wars and the reconstitution of international society at the Congress
of Vienna, the rights and powers of international legal personality were
increasingly seen as belonging to certain, special peoples. Given the traditional
understanding of sovereignty, however, the question was about how to justifiably
draw the line between those true sovereigns and the rest. Indeed, by the second
half of the nineteenth century, international lawyers increasingly needed legal
justifications that warranted the exclusion of large portions of the world from the
rights of sovereignty. The problem was that within the confines of classic liberal
theory, it was unclear how to make these kinds of distinctions.142
This hierarchy of racial classification became the template for what
international lawyers coined “the Family of Nations,” that community of states
that were ostensibly free and equal in the exercise of the rights of international legal
personality. This use of racial classification as a legal justification for outlining the
scope of the Family of Nations was integral to what I have called in this Article
international law’s “classic racial ideology.” In the American context of the
Monroe Doctrine, I looked to the examples of Elihu Root and Alejandro Alvarez as

142. See, e.g., GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL SOVEREIGNS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (2004).
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demonstrative of a racialized practice of argument in which certain human
populations were considered ill-deserving of membership in the Family of Nations.
Nevertheless, even as lawyers like Alvarez and Root comfortably deployed
classic forms of racialized justification, what eventually seemed common ground
was a view of global society as having matured beyond the problem of racism as
any longer a fundamental feature of the international legal order. International
law’s race problem—congratulations all around—was largely solved. The
remaining fight would be engaged on the terrain of human rights law, and the
elimination of individual acts of prejudice and discrimination.143
This is the moment of a great feint, a moment of powerful misdirection that
continues to cast a shadow on our own contemporary global order. As classic
racial ideology began to fade, the problem of racial exclusion looked to loosen as a
problem for international law. Soon, peoples once banished to the domain of
colonies, mandates, and trusts would find their way as equals in the United
Nations’s new world, where at least in the General Assembly, every people would
enjoy a sovereign voice. With the international community’s attention held by the
gradual shift away from the Family of Nations and imperialism and toward the
United Nations and decolonization, this focus on inclusion distracted away from
an ideology of exclusion unfolding elsewhere. The racial ideology of exclusion was
still hard at work with a gatekeeping function, but no longer gatekeeping who
could be a sovereign. Distracted by the apparent sense in which a racialized right
to exclude was feigning retreat at the level of a more inclusive United Nations, that
very same ideology was manifesting a regime of highly exclusionary border
controls. That is, while at the level of the sovereign community racial ideology
morphed into an ideology of inclusion, at the level of border control a new racial
ideology was busily valorizing an ideology of exclusion.
To restate the point: Racial ideology’s gatekeeping function in international
law did not disappear in the transition from the Family of Nations to the United
Nations, and in some ways, it even strengthened. It was now working hard at the
territorial border between states in a way that was entirely novel, even as the
conceptual borderland between the Family of Nations and the uncivilized world
was becoming more and more a story of economic development.144 The
international legal presumption that a sovereign enjoyed a plenary right to exclude
foreign individuals from its territory, in much the same way that an individual
property owner could exclude the world, was coming into view for the first time.
143. For discussion, see E. Tendayi Achiume, Beyond Prejudice: Structural Xenophobic
Discrimination Against Refugees, 45 GEO. L.J. 323 (2014).
144. For discussion, see SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONISING INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEVELOPMENT,
ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND THE POLITICS OF UNIVERSALITY (2011).
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And it came with a vengeance. As has been thoroughly documented in the
study of citizenship and immigration at the turn of the twentieth century,
international law was increasingly relied on as a means for justifying the
sovereign’s right to control the boundaries of its demos, as well as to determine
the identity of its citizens. The results, at least in the United States, were as racially
marked as they were severe. What’s more, this is also the moment of a racialized
xenophobia rearing its head at the border.145 To be sure, xenophobia hardly
comes into existence at the end of the nineteenth century. Rather, the point is that
as racial ideology morphed from its exclusionary work at the level of sovereigns
and came to play a constitutive role in new thinking about border controls, “fear
of the foreigner” took on a new and different significance, as well as justification,
in international law.
The aim of this Article has been to explore this shift from the classic to the
modern mode of racial ideology in international law. My claim is that until we
can better understand what became of international law’s classic mode of racial
ideology, and how it morphed into a modern structure, we will continue to see
international law’s race problem as entirely marginal: a problem that does not
really infect the discipline as much as it does individual agents. Without this, we
are at a disadvantage when it comes to studying the ideological legacy of the
modern structure, and the status of international law’s race problem today.
The discussion above intended to suggest how antiracist strategy in
international law might have taken a route through the field of migration and
border control. Instead, a racialized right to exclude that had been raised to defend
the frontiers of international society, has now been duplicated at the borders of
national societies. It was here that modern racial ideology justified a new form of
racialized exclusion. At the same time, modern racial ideology manifested a
distinctly inclusive approach to global race relations. But an important aspect of
this architecture of inclusion was something beyond a mere willingness to open up
international institutions to more participation.146 It was also the advent of human
rights law, and in particular, the antidiscrimination principle. This advent was
bittersweet. For just as “inclusion” was a desirable turn for international society
with its own sorts of challenges, so too did the human rights approach both signal
welcome developments and at the same time a closing down of alternative

145. See, e.g., REGINALD HORSMAN, RACE AND MANIFEST DESTINY: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
RACIAL ANGLO-SAXONISM (1981); KUNAL M. PARKER, MAKING FOREIGNERS: IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP LAW IN AMERICA, 1600–2000 (2015); BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, LAW AND THE
BORDERS OF BELONGING IN THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES (2010).
146. For discussion, see, for example, STEPHEN C. NEFF, JUSTICE AMONG NATIONS (2014); SIMPSON,
supra note 142.
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approaches to racial justice. And it is this closing down that marks the arrival of a
third structure—our contemporary structure of postracial ideology—the
structure of raciality in which we find ourselves today.

